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1. In May 1950 the position of political officer at company level was reestablished in the Soviet Army. His official title is Deputy Company Commander-Political ("Zamestitel' Komandira Roty po Politchasti"). This officer is responsible for political indoctrination of enlisted personnel. He does not conduct any political work among officers attached to the company, and is not responsible for their indoctrination. The position of deputy company commander-political had been established in the Soviet Army for a short period during the World War II, from Spring to Fall 1943. This means that from Fall 1943 to Spring 1950 there were no political officers in company size units in the Soviet Army. Therefore it would be wrong to consider the creation of this position as a return of the Soviet Army to a wartime basis. The purpose of the present policy, as it was explained in the War Ministry directive 0085 issued in Aug 1951, is to relieve company commanding officers from work and responsibilities not directly connected with combat training and readiness of their units. Political officers are subordinate to their immediate commanding officers at all levels.
2. Political officers at battalion level have the status of Deputy Commanding Officer-Political. They are responsible for political indoctrination of the battalion's entire personnel including both officers and enlisted men. In the field of political education the battalion's political officer is the immediate superior of all company political officers. A similar position of Deputy Commanding Officer-Political exists also in all regimental size units.

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3. According to army regulations all deputies for political affairs have less disciplinary power than their respective commander. This disciplinary power extends not only to the political field but, like any line officer's, to any kind of disciplinary violations. if political officers were deprived of their ordinary disciplinary power, their position in the army would become quite insignificant.
4. In divisions and larger units there is in addition to Deputy Commander-Political a so-called Division (Army) Party Commission (Divizionnaya (Armeyskaya) Partiynaya Komissiya), composed of five elected members of the Communist Party and a secretary. Usually members of this commission are ranking officers, regimental or battalion commanders or staff officers. This commission does not have any disciplinary power over ordinary military personnel. Its power is restricted to political matters and applies only to regular party members, not even to Komsomol members. The commission has the authority to summon to its session any party member violating discipline or deviating from the party line and to impose the following punishments: a warning, a reprimand, a severe reprimand, expulsion from the party. Political punishments imposed by this commission in no way preclude other punishments for the same violation by responsible military commanders.
5. Although the power of MGB is almost unlimited it does not officially extend to the army. MGB is not authorized to investigate or arrest military personnel without permission from the respective unit commander. In practice, however, a commander is never asked for "permission"; at best, MGB simply "notifies" the commanding officer of what they are doing in his unit.
6. The attitude of Soviet soldiers toward political indoctrination may be briefly qualified as indifferent and apathetic. Soldiers are not interested in political lectures, mainly because they are "dry stuff", and partly because soldiers feel, instinctively if not clearly, that the political indoctrination is mostly based on lies. Since attendance is obligatory, soldiers have to sit through the lectures and listen to them, or at least pretend to do so. There are no discussions after lectures, but it is customary for the lecturer to ask the audience whether there are any questions. Everybody is afraid to ask any questions which may be interpreted as criticisms of the regime or of the party policy. Occasionally, however, such questions are asked in spite of possible consequences. They are left either unanswered, or the questioner is cut off with: "So it is, and so it will be."
7. the main line of political propaganda and indoctrination in the army was the same: "America is preparing for an aggressive war against the Soviet Union". This propaganda had actually started much earlier than 1949, probably in 1946, and is still the main subject exploited at meetings and lectures. did not notice any new development or change in the Party line as expounded in the Soviet Army. Among political publications available to officers and enlisted men the following: "Propagandist i Agitator", "Bloknot Agitatora" (Agitator's Notebook), both monthly periodicals.

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50X1 [redacted] There were several other weekly and monthly
 50X1 periodicals [redacted] never read
 50X1 any of them, and [redacted] believe nobody did. This is not only
 50X1 because army personnel do not have sufficient time, but because
 these publications are of no interest to them. Soldiers mostly
 use these periodicals for cigarette paper. Frequently political
 officers give short press reviews covering news at home and
 abroad. It is hard to say whether soldiers feel that they are
 kept well informed. It must be remembered that these lectures
 are their only source of information and that the majority of
 soldiers probably believe what they are told, except, of
 course, the lies about America preparing for aggressive war
 against the Soviet Union, which are discounted by a great major-
 50X1 ity. Soviet propaganda broadcasts, just as propaganda lectures,
 50X1 are met with indifference and apathy. Musical programs and
 50X1 sport events on the contrary, attract large audiences. [redacted]

50X1 [redacted] there
 50X1 never were discussions among soldiers after political meetings
 or lectures elaborating on ideas presented by the lecturer.
 Such discussions are rare even among officers who do not like
 to talk in public about "ticklish matters"

8. Soviet films are shown to soldiers as a part of morale educa-
 tion. These are usually Soviet patriotic films glorifying
 the Red Army, military heroes, or national figures like Minin,
 Pozharskiy, and Suvorov. Normally these films are shown on
 Saturday and Sunday. All these films, although very good from
 the artistic point of view, are "old stuff" shown over and over,
 and therefore do not attract large audiences. None is with-
 out some propaganda element. Otherwise, except for soccer
 games, there are no recreational activities available to Soviet
 soldiers.

9. In off duty hours Soviet soldiers feel more lonely than they
 were in the USSR; they hang around and do not give the impres-
 sion of being happy. It is true that in the army they get
 better billets, better food and better clothes, and even their
 work is not as hard as at home. All this, however, does not
 compensate for the loss of freedom of movement to which they
 are subjected in Germany. [redacted]

50X1 [redacted] There
 50X1 is no immediate link in a soldier's mind between his personal
 50X1 unhappiness and the policy of the regime. [redacted]
 basically soldiers are dissatisfied with the conditions of their
 50X1 life, but this feeling is subdued and it would be hard to say
 how many soldiers actually put the blame on the regime for
 their unhappiness. Moreover, there is quite a difference
 between war veterans and young soldiers. The first group is
 much more dissatisfied, and even bitter, than the youngsters who
 take all restrictions imposed upon them as something belonging
 to army life and for which there is no cure.

10. Since General Eisenhower was sent to Europe, Soviet propaganda
 blasts him as an aggressor preparing an attack against the
 Soviet Union. Soviet war veterans who had heard much about
 Gen Eisenhower during and immediately after the war have
 quite a favorable opinion of him. Stories are told of his
 personal friendship with Marshal Zhukov, who was extremely
 popular among the military. They do not believe the warmonger-
 ing stories about Eisenhower. But it cannot be forgotten that

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50X1 propaganda is a tremendous weapon, and the same lies repeated
50X1 day after day are slowly gaining ground. On the other hand
50X1 there are fewer and fewer war veterans with a sound judgement
in the Soviet Army. [redacted] no position to say what effect
the election of General Eisenhower to the Presidency of the
United States would have on the Russian people. [redacted]
50X1 [redacted] Soviet propaganda will not fail to capitalize on
this event in order to convince the population that the
"warmongering" policy of General Eisenhower has become the
national policy of the US. But many Soviet citizens would
discard this threat with a shrug of the shoulders: "So
what?" They know that there is no liberation from the Com-
munist regime without a war in which it is defeated.

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